Terminological clarification
The expression 'the linguistic turn' was introduced by Gustav Bergmann in his review of Strawson's Individuals in 1960 . Bergmann (1906 (Theoria 29 (1963) ). 1 The linguistic turn, according to Bergmann, is a 'fundamental gambit as to method' agreed upon by two different groups of linguistic philosophers: 'ordinary language philosophers' (exemplified, in Bergmann's view, by Strawson) and 'ideal language philosophers' (such as Bergmann himself). The methodological gambit is to talk about the world by talking about a suitable language. The disagreement between the two groups of philosophers turns, according to Bergmann, on what is to count as a language and what makes it suitable as an object of investigation that will shed light for philosophical purposes on the nature of the world, in particular on ontology. Why should the linguistic turn be taken? In Bergmann's view, for three reasons. First, words are used either ordinarily, i.e. 'commonsensically', or philosophically. Philosophical uses of words are prima facie unintelligible, and require commonsensical explication. That is a requirement of the method. Second, much of the obscurity of pre-linguistic-philosophy stems from failure to distinguish linguistic statements from meta-linguistic statements. The method is the safest way to avoid the ensuing confusions. Third, there are some things which any language can only show. For example, the relation of exemplification shows itself by subject predicate juxtaposition (e.g. 'a is F ' shows that the property F is exemplified by the object a). Such things, however, (pace Wittgenstein) are not ineffable. Rather they can be spoken about, as we have just done, in a meta-linguistic discussion of the syntax and interpretation of a language. Hence, again, the linguistic turn.
Ordinary language philosophers, according to Bergmann, talk about the language we speak.
They study communication, explore how we learn language, and how we communicate by using it. This, he declared, is a psychological study. In the hands of 'extremists', like J. L. Austin, that is all it is. Since we use ordinary language to communicate about the world, there is some sense in which it 'must therefore be a picture of the world', and must, in a minimal sense, be a 'suitable' language by the study of which one can engage in ontological investigation. If that purpose is disregarded, and the three reasons for the linguistic turn neglected, then ordinary language philosophy degenerates into trivial linguistics -this being Bergmann's judgement on Austin. But because the primary use of ordinary language is communication, it is actually most unsuitable as a philosophical tool. What is needed is an 'ideal language', or, more accurately, a schema of a language, which adequately pictures the world. And that is the instrumental goal of ideal language philosophers. If it is not, then ideal language philosophy degenerates into trivial design of calculi -this being (presumably) Bergmann's judgement on Carnap's philosophy.
The misconstruals of both the Carnapian wing of the Vienna Circle (who can be deemed 'ideal language philosophers') and of Strawson and others of the Oxford group of post-war philosophers (whose classification as 'ordinary language philosophers' requires clarification, and was rejected by Strawson himself) is startling. Carnap did not construct artificial calculi for ontological purposes. Indeed, in 'Empiricism, Semantic and Ontology', he argued that ontological questions are no more than questions about the framework of the language one chose to use -questions about a language and its utility, not questions about reality. 2 Far from inventing artificial calculi for ontological purposes, he invented them in order to shed light on the language of science and to resolve philosophical problems and dissolve pseudo-problems. So called ordinary language philosophers, who would better be denominated 'natural language philosophers' (in contrast to ideal language philosophers) were not engaging in psychology or in linguistics. The reasons Bergmann gave for the so called linguistic turn are equally spurious. There is indeed something that might be called the linguistic turn in philosophy, but, as we shall see, the reasons for it are very far removed from Bergmann's peculiar list.
Had the matter rested with Bergmann, the expression 'the linguistic turn' would very likely never have been heard again. But the name appealed to Richard Rorty -and he put it to good use in an eponymous anthology of writings he edited in 1967. The Linguistic Turn -recent essays in philosophical method contained 37 essays (some of which are replies to others) by many of the leading analytic philosophers of the day (and of the previous thirty years). The book was divided into four parts. The first consisted of essays by Schlick, Carnap, Bergmann, Ryle, Wisdom and Malcolm.
These all argued, in very different ways and for very different reasons, that philosophical questions are, in a sense which they duly tried to elucidate, 'questions of language'. Part II was entitled 
It is clear from this description of the contents of his anthology that Rorty took from
Bergmann the division of the linguistic turn into a dual carriageway, one lane of which was 'ordinary language philosophy' and the other 'ideal language philosophy'. Wisely, he did not repeat Bergmann's confused characterization of these two tendencies. Rorty, perfectly correctly, appreciated that a sea-change had occurred in analytic philosophy in the 1930s, and had continued after the Second World War. He characterized philosophers who participated in this change as 'linguistic philosophers' and restricted his selection largely to philosophers active in Britain and America. This included of course some of the emigré Austrian and German logical empiricists who had fled the Nazis and had brought about a powerful synthesis of the spirit of logical empiricism with American pragmatism. Rorty announced that the purpose of his anthology was to provide materials for reflection on linguistic philosophy, which he described as 'the most recent philosophical revolution '. 4 The revolutionaries were held to include many who would have been loath to accept the banner 'linguistic philosophy', such as Carnap, Quine, and Bar-Hillel. For the name 'linguistic philosophy' was already associated with the group of Oxford philosophers in the post-war years whom Bergmann had (misleadingly) characterized as 'ordinary language philosophers'. But Rorty was well guarded against any accusation of misdescription. He characterized linguistic philosophy as 'the view that philosophical problems are problems that may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language or by understanding more about the language we presently use' -and the first disjunct could safely be held to include the so-called ideal-language philosophers such as Carnap and regimented-language philosophers such as Quine (who did indeed have ontological preoccupations that approximate Bergmann's specifications).
So, according to Rorty, the linguistic turn in philosophy is exhibited by the distinctive methodologies of two different strands within 'linguistic' philosophy. However, there were further claims afoot in both Bergmann's paper and in Rorty's essay and anthology. For it is clearly not only a pair of methods that is associated with the philosophical movement that they called linguistic philosophy. The methods go hand in hand with the claim that the source (or, at least, one major source) of the problems of philosophy lies in the misleading forms of natural languages. And linked with that is the suggestion that philosophical questions are questions of language (vide the title of Part I of Rorty's anthology 'Classic Statements of the Thesis that Philosophical Questions are Questions of Language'). The latter supposition stands in need of much clarification. Does it mean that philosophical questions are questions about language? If so, does it follow that philosophy is just a branch of linguistics? Does it mean that philosophical theories and theses are theories and theses about language? Or does it just recapitulate the methodological claim that philosophical problemswhatever they are -are solved or resolved by one or the other of the two methods suggested?
As we progress, we shall attend to a number of distinct questions:
What, according to linguistic philosophers thus understood, is the subject matter of philosophy?
What is a philosophical problem and how is it to be distinguished from other kinds of problems, e.g. in science or mathematics?
What is the source (or sources) of the problems of philosophy?
What is the appropriate method (or methods) for the solution of philosophical problems?
What is the result of successful philosophical investigations? Is it philosophical truths (akin to the truths produced by successful scientific investigations)? If so, how are they to be characterized?
And if it is not, what is it?
What was distinctive about what Bergmann and Rorty called the linguistic turn in philosophy is evident in the kinds of answers given by analytic philosophers to these questions. The linguistic turn was in fact a phase (or more accurately a number of phases) in the development of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. There was nothing novel about the claim that misleading features of natural languages are responsible for philosophical confusions (Plato and Aristotle pointed that out). Nor was there anything new about the suggestion that careful scrutiny of the use of the terms that lead to confusion will help dispel it (Aristotle excelled at that). These, out of context, are platitudes that should be known to every philosopher and philosophy student. To see what was new about this distinctive movement in philosophy, it has to be located in its historical context.
Historical stage-setting
It is evident that the expression 'the linguistic turn in philosophy' is used as a characterization of a change of direction in the development of analytic philosophy. It is worthwhile briefly locating analytic philosophy in relation to the development of European philosophy in the nineteenth century.
The linguistic turn that occurred in the 1920s was preceded by a logistic turn that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, prior to the rise of analytic philosophy. The study of logic had been almost totally neglected from Descartes onward (with the exception of Leibniz) -indeed so much so that Kant, at the end of the eighteenth century, could declare that logic, since Aristotle, 'has not been able to advance a step and is thus to all appearance complete and perfect' (Critique of Pure Reason B. viii). This illusion (which, incidentally, displayed complete ignorance of Stoic and medieval logic) was to be dispelled by a group of mathematicians and mathematically minded philosophers in the mid-nineteenth century, namely de Morgan, Boole, Venn, Jevons and Schröder in Britain and Germany, and Huntington and Peirce in the USA. Mathematical logic, as de Morgan called it in 1858, was designed to represent the forms of thought by the mathematicization of logic. Boole invented logical algebra, which presented logic as a branch of abstract algebra, and his idea was taken up by Frege's invention of function-theoretic logic, which generalized the mathematical theory of functions in order to show not that logic was reducible to arithmetic, but rather that arithmetic was reducible to logic. Frege's great advances in mathematical logic, e.g. the introduction of the quantifier/bound variable technique for presenting general and existential statements and statements involving multiple generality, the complete formalization of the propositional calculus and the axiomatization of the firstorder predicate calculus with identity, were followed by those of Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica. The invention of modern mathematical logic inaugurated a century of intense logical research and the creation of further forms of logic such as modal, tense and deontic logics.
Frege's primary concern was to demonstrate that arithmetic is derivable from logic. It was to that end that he invented his function-theoretic logic. He conceived of his logical system as an ideal language for logical and proof theoretic purposes. It was, he suggested, related to natural languages as the microscope to the eye. His philosophical attitude to natural language as a tool for the purposes of the philosophy of logic and mathematics was one of contempt. Natural languages did not evolve for the purposes of logical proofs; for that purpose one needs to invent a logically perfect languagewhich is what he presented his 'conceptual notation' as. This, broadly speaking, was also Russell's view. He conceived of the Peano-derived symbolism and of the formation rules of Principia as the syntax of a logically ideal language. Does this make Frege into the originator of the linguistic turn in philosophy -belonging to the ideal language wing of the movement? That would be mistaken. First, if the mere invention of formal calculi and ideal languages for logical and proof-theoretic purposes is to introduce the linguistic turn, then many earlier philosophers made the linguistic turn, and it ceases to be a crucial aspect of, and phase in, the development of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Those whom Rorty called 'ideal language philosophers' (e.g. Carnap and Quine) had a much larger and philosophically more ambitions agenda than that. Secondly, Frege had no general view of the sources of, nature of , or methods of solving, philosophical problems. He did not hold that all or even most philosophical questions are questions of language (which, according to Rorty, is one aspect of the linguistic turn). Nor did he claim that all or even most philosophical questions are to be answered or resolved by either examining the use of natural language or by inventing an ideal language (which, mathematics, logic and philosophical logic. And he invented his conceptual notation for purposes of his logicist project -not to solve or resolve the problems of epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, etc.
What is true is that the function theoretic logic that Frege and Russell devised was the source of the pre-occupation of twentieth-century analytic philosophy with logic and the philosophy of logic.
Moreover, the powerful logic they invented made it possible for their successors, once the linguistic turn had been taken, to devise a variety of putatively ideal languages for the purposes of philosophical analysis. There is no doubt that Frege and Russell were the main influences on the young Wittgenstein, who was stimulated by their work into demolishing much of its alleged philosophical import in the Tractatus and replacing it with a quite different vision, as well as on Carnap, who constructed his programme of logical syntax and later logical semantics on foundations they and Wittgenstein had laid. In so far as one lane of the linguistic turn is conceived to be that of ideal or regimented language-construction, then that lane emerged from the confluence of two roads -the logistic turn, on the one hand, and analytic philosophy on the other. Moore and Russell thought of themselves as analysing the elements of reality -the constituents and forms of facts, and as aiming to describe and catalogue the logical forms of the world. Analysis, as they understood it, involved the decomposition of facts into their ultimate simple constituents and the revelation of their logical forms. How intelligible this idea was is debatable, but it was given support by Russell's theory of descriptions (1905) in which he purported to show by analysis how sentences containing singular definite descriptions which appear to refer to an object do not really do so. (1914) ). It was during this phase in Russell's development that he contended that 'Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found not to be philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical. It is above all this book and its impact upon the Vienna Circle and the Cambridge school of analysis in the 1920s that is the source of the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy.
The Tractatus starts the turn
Wittgenstein conceived of the Tractatus as solving the most fundamental problems of philosophy (TLP, Preface). 4 The intention of the book was to bring the logistic turn into the heart of philosophy.
His work, he observed,'extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world'. 5 Where Frege and Russell had thought of natural languages as logically defective and of their artificial languages as logically perfect, Wittgenstein conceived of logic as a transcendental condition of representation, and hence as constituting the depth-grammar of any possible language. Hence natural language 'is all right as it is' -a language cannot be logically defective, for if it were its sentences would not express a sense, and so it would be no language at all. But the surface grammar of natural language is deeply misleading, and it is the task of analysis to reveal its depth structure, for which the essence of the proposition and hence logic itself (which follows from it) provide the adamantine foundations. 'All philosophy', Wittgenstein wrote, 'is a "critique" of language' (TLP 4.0031). This remark heralds the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy. Wittgenstein later laid out the general programme for philosophy that was consequent upon the achievement of the Tractatus:
The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudo-propositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudo-propositions, and uses its terms unambiguously. 6 This imaginary symbolism was not an ideal language, but an ideally perspicuous notation that would display the depth grammar of language. This, however, was a task for the future (and was never fulfilled). What the Tractatus itself aimed to do was above all to disclose the nature of logical necessity, the essence of representation, and the limits of thought.
In six different respects, the Tractatus introduced the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy, marking a sharp break with the conception of analysis advocated by Moore and Russell. 7 i. Most of the propositions and questions in past philosophy are not false but nonsensicaltransgressing the bounds of sense. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from failure to grasp the logic of our language (TLP 4.003). So the roots of most philosophical problems lie in misleading features of the surface grammar of natural language, and they can be resolved only by logico-linguistic analysis.
ii. Although the book aimed to set the limits of thought (TLP. Preface), this, Wittgenstein argued, can be done only by setting the limits of language, i.e. by determining the boundary between sense and nonsense. This put language and its forms, the conditions of sense, and the relationship between language and reality at the centre of philosophical investigation.
iii. The key to achieving this goal was the clarification of the essential nature of the propositional-sign (TLP 3.1431). That was done by determining the general propositional form -i.e.
by giving 'a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meanings of names are suitably chosen' (TLP 4.5).
iv. The most influential achievement of the book was its clarification of the nature of logical truth. This was done by an investigation of symbolism. It was argued that the 'peculiar mark of logical propositions [is] that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic' (TLP 6.113) . Contrary to what both Frege and Russell thought, the propositions of logic are not essentially general (but essentially true), they say nothing at all, but are rather senseless, i.e. limiting cases of propositions with a sense. In particular, they are not descriptions of relations between thoughts as Frege supposed, nor are they descriptions of the most general facts in the universe as Russell had suggested.
v. The positive programme for future philosophy was committed to logico-linguistic analysis of propositions, i.e. sentences with a sense. The task of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts, which is to be done by the clarification of sentences (TLP 4.112).
vi. The negative programme for future philosophy was to demonstrate the illegitimacy of metaphysical assertions. This is to be done by demonstrating how the attempt to say something metaphysical, i.e. necessary truths about essential features of the world and about essential features of representation by means of language, inevitably transgress the bounds of what can be said in any language. Such truths, by the very nature of language cannot be said (although they are shown by well-formed propositions of language).
A corollary of these points is a dramatic curtailing of the aspirations of philosophy. Since philosophy cannot deliver any metaphysical truths or say anything at all about the essence of the world, since the only expressible necessity is the vacuous necessity of the tautologies of logic, there are no philosophical propositions. Any attempt to propound philosophical propositions, as manifest in traditional philosophy and in the Tractatus itself, results in nonsense, since it unavoidably employs formal or categorial concepts as if they were material concepts. But formal concepts are akin to unbound variables, and nonsense -an ill-formed word-sequence -ensues. Philosophy is not a cognitive discipline, but a critical and elucidatory one. The analysis of propositions delivers no new truths about the world, but only clarifications of existing propositions and exposure of metaphysical nonsense. This unprecedented idea was pivotal to the ensuing linguistic turn.
These methodological claims, the achievement of the book in clarifying the nature of logic, and the programme for future philosophy had an immense influence upon the next two phases of analytic philosophy -the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and its affiliates, and the short lived school of Cambridge analysis (e.g. Ramsey, Wisdom, Braithwaite, as well as Moore from the older generation), which cannot be discussed here.
It would be disingenuous to hold that the Tractatus itself completed the linguistic turn. It was too deeply rooted in the idea that there are things that can be shown but not said -in particular things about the essence of the world and the essential nature of representation. The whole of the Tractatus was concerned with elaborating such deep truths -therein lay its grandeur. The conception of representation that informs the book is rooted in a metaphysical vision of the world, as well as a metaphysics of symbolism (e.g. that only simple names can represent simple things, that only relations can represent relations and that only facts can represent facts). Of course, the book grants at the end that its very attempt to describe the conditions of representation and the limits of thought and its expression are themselves things that cannot be said but are shown by well-formed propositions with a sense. It is only when this ineffable metaphysical baggage is jettisoned, as it was by the Vienna Circle, the Cambridge analysts, and Wittgenstein himself in the 1930s that the linguistic turn was completed.
Logical empiricism and the linguistic turn
The Vienna Circle was a group of philosopher-scientists and philosophically-minded mathematicians The upshot was that the members of the Circle adopted a set of methodological and substantive doctrines that might well be thought to characterize 'the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy'.
It was generally accepted that philosophy is not a cognitive discipline that may add to the body of human knowledge. There are no special philosophical propositions in the sense in which there are propositions of the natural sciences. Moreover, there is no such thing as first philosophy which provides the foundations for empirical science. The traditional problems of philosophy (especially of metaphysics) are pseudo-problems that arise through (i) misleading features of natural language, and (ii) the misguided idea that thought can yield substantive knowledge independently of experience.
Philosophy is an activity of clarification of problems that arise out of misleading features of natural language. Its method is the clarification of sentences of natural language that give rise to philosophical problems (Schlick and Waismann, under the influence of Wittgenstein in the early 1930s), or the logical analysis of language and the investigation of the logical syntax of the language of science (Carnap and Neurath). 'The logic of science', Carnap wrote, 'takes the place of the inextricable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy' 13 , and the logic of science just is the logical syntax of the language of science. This polarity within the Circle was associated with a parallel divergence of views in respect of the project of unified science which was Neurath's dream.
The result of philosophy, Schlick claimed (very much under Wittgenstein's influence) is that some of its problems 'will disappear by being shown to be mistakes and misunderstandings of our language and others will be found to be ordinary scientific questions in disguise. These remarks, I think, determine the whole future of philosophy.' 14 Carnap had a less negative conception. 'In our discussions in the Vienna Circle', he wrote later, 'it had turned out that any attempt at formulating more precisely the philosophical problems in which we were interested ended up with problems in the logical analysis of language. Since in our view the issue in philosophical problems concerned the language not the world, these problems should be formulated, not in the object language, but in the meta-language.' This conviction led to the writing of The Logical Syntax of Language (1934) were writing (in the 1960s) the Vienna Circle had disappeared, and so-called ordinary language philosophy was represented by Oxford philosophers and their followers in the years after 1945. Ideal language philosophers, on the other hand, were represented by Carnap and Bergmann and their followers in the USA, as well as by Quine. Quine was a self-confessed apostate from the logical empiricism of the Circle, denying the distinction between analytic propositions and empirical ones, hence denying any sharp differentiation of scientific from a priori propositions, and denying that the task of philosophy is purely elucidatory. It is part and parcel of the general human endeavour to achieve knowledge of the world. Nevertheless, he advocated the regimentation of natural language.
His idea was that translating our 'theories' into the first-order predicate calculus will reveal our ontological commitments. Redundant commitments can be eliminated by a canonical notation. His goal was as austere an ontology as possible consistent with having a regimented language adequate for all scientific purposes. iii. The disposition to cleave to an explanatory paradigm or model (e.g. to conceive of the mental on the pattern of the physical, and so to think that mental objects, states, processes are just like physical ones only mental, or to conceive of transfinite cardinals on the model of cardinal numbers, only vastly greater) and hence to extend its usefulness beyond its natural limits iv. The will to illusion What then is the subject matter of 'theoretical' (as opposed to 'practical' 18 ) philosophy? In the sense in which the natural sciences have a subject matter the successful investigation of which yields empirical truths and a body of established knowledge, philosophy has none. In another sense, one may say that the subject matter of philosophy consists of the peculiar problems of philosophy. 17 For a brilliant investigation of the problems of representing plural reference in the predicate calculus, see H. Ben-Yami, Logic and Natural Language -on plural reference and its semantic and logical significance (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) . 18 The debates about the nature of philosophy in the twentieth-century were focused largely upon what Kant called 'theoretical' philosophy, i.e. philosophy of logic and language, metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind as well as the philosophies of special sciences (e.g. of biology, physics, mathematics, social sciences). How those debates bear upon practical philosophy (i.e. ethics, political and legal philosophy), its aims, methods and limits, is worth discussing, but not in this context. What then is a philosophical problem? Wittgenstein wisely eschewed a definition, instead giving an array of uncontroversially philosophical problems as examples. These, to be sure, do share some features. Philosophical problems are a priori, not empirical. So philosophy is sharply distinct from the natural sciences. Philosophical problems can no more be solved by experiment and observation than can problems of mathematics. They are conceptual problems -difficulties that result from some unclarity or entanglement in our concepts that may, as we have just seen, have multiple and diverse roots, mostly in misleading features of language. These lead us, both in the formulation of philosophical problems and in our often bungled attempts to resolve them, to transgress the bounds of sense in subtle and commonly unnoticed ways.
The methods of philosophy are manifold. They are descriptive and comparative-descriptive, not hypothetical or hypothetico-deductive like the natural sciences. Central among them is the assembling of familiar rules for the use of words, which Wittgenstein idiosyncratically called grammatical propositions. These are familiar meaning-rules for the use of words, given typically in the material mode, e.g. 'Pain is a sensation', 'Different people may have the same pain', 'To mean something by a word is not an act'. The careful selection of such propositions and their ordering in a surveyable representation is tailored to the specific philosophical problem at hand. But the recollection and marshalling of ordinary (or even technical) usage is not the sole method available to the philosopher. Wittgenstein introduced and made use of the method of invented language-gamesimaginary linguistic activities that are invoked to shed light on our own linguistic practices by way of both similarities and differences. He often invited his readers to reflect on how an expression might be taught to a learner in order to shed light on the primitive core of its use. He insisted on paying less attention to grammatical form and more attention to the role and purpose of expressions. His aim of uncovering the sources of philosophical confusion in a misleading analogy or mesmerizing paradigm that is inapplicable, or in a transposition of a grammatical articulation that obtains in one domain of grammar (or language-game) to another involves a further battery of methods. All these are subservient to the goals of philosophy.
Philosophy has two very general goals, the one subordinate to the other. Its primary task is the resolution and dissolution of philosophical problems. Since these problems are symptomatic of conceptual confusions and bafflement, which may be compared to a kind of intellectual disease, their resolution may be conceived metaphorically as a kind of intellectual therapy. Philosophy, one may then say, is a cure for diseases of the understanding. Its result is not new knowledge of the world, but the disentangling of the knots we tie in our understanding. Its second goal is to attain an overview of a concept and to produce a surveyable representation of the relevant field of concepts that will facilitate the resolution of the philosophical problems at hand. This he compared to drawing a mapa map that will help us find our way around in the field of our concepts and conceptual structures.
Wittgenstein's work was a major influence upon the further development of linguistic philosophy after the Second World War. His pupils and followers, such as Von Wright, Wisdom, and Anscombe, who succeeded him in his chair in Cambridge, and Ambrose, Black, Malcolm and Bouwsma in the USA ensured the further spread of his ideas and methods. But the centre from which most further advances in linguistic philosophy ('ordinary language philosophy', to use Bergmann's and Rorty's misleading phrase) was Oxford.
Oxford philosophy and the linguistic turn
For a quarter of a century after the war, Oxford was the centre of analytic philosophy in the world.
'Oxford philosophy' was not a school. Unlike the Vienna Circle, it issued no manifesto. It had no ideology akin to the 'Unified Science' of the Circle. Some of the philosophers at Oxford were influenced by Wittgenstein to a greater or lesser extent (e.g. Ryle and Strawson), some were his pupils (Waismann, Paul and Anscombe), and others developed their views quite independently (e.g. Austin, Grice). But Oxford was more of a flourishing field fertilized by Wittgenstein's ideas than bare soil in which Wittgenstein's seeds grew. Unlike both the Circle and Wittgenstein, Oxford philosophers were fairly relaxed about the use of the term 'theory' in connection with philosophy, as long as a 'philosophical theory' was not assumed to be analogous to a scientific theory. They were equally relaxed about the idea of philosophical propositions and their truth or falsity, as long as it was realised that they are not empirical propositions. The leading figures at Oxford exhibited a variety of viewpoints united primarily by agreed meta-philosophical and methodological ideas, as well as a commitment to clarity of expression, perspicuity of argument, and detestation of obfuscation. The following methodological points would have been accepted by almost all: i. Philosophy is distinct from the empirical sciences, and its problems cannot be solved by observation, experiment and hypothetico-deductive theory. Its problems are a priori, conceptual ones.
ii. Formal calculi, such as the predicate calculus, are neither the depth grammar of any possible language nor ideal languages that illuminate or mirror the logical structure of the world (among other things, the world has no logical structure). Their usefulness in philosophy is very limited indeed. (What venerable philosophical problems have been solved by recourse to an artificial language?)
iii. Metaphysics, understood as an investigation into the essential nature of reality is an incoherent enterprise. Admittedly, in Individuals (1959), Strawson introduced the term 'descriptive metaphysics', which made the word 'metaphysics' philosophically 'correct' again after some decades on the Index. But it was misleading of him to do so, since descriptive metaphysics is just more analytic description of the structure of our conceptual scheme, not synthetic description of the structure of the world. But he was careful not to exaggerate its powers. Certainly, he wrote, 'ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can be everywhere superseded. Only remember it is the first word'. Grice (not in the least influenced by Wittgenstein -and far more prone to construct philosophical 'theories' than his peers) said that a proposition that would have commanded universal assent in Oxford at the time was that 'a careful examination of the detailed features of ordinary discourse is required as a foundation for philosophical thinking', and wrote of Austin's methods that When put to work, this conception of ordinary language seemed to offer fresh and manageable approaches to philosophical ideas and problems . . . When properly regulated and directed, 'linguistic botanizing' seems to me to provide a valuable initiation to the philosophical treatment of a concept, particularly if what is under examination (and it is arguable that this should always be the case) is a family of different but related concepts. stage, in a philosophical inquiry, and that it is lamentable that this lesson has been forgotten, or has never been learned. 22 Strawson was less inclined to the careful examination of usage than Austin, but, unlike his old tutor deeper misconceptions of what Oxford linguistic (or 'ordinary language') philosophy had been, became widespread. So, before concluding, an overview may be helpful.
As we have seen, the expression 'the linguistic turn' is useful to signal an important shift in meta-philosophical reflection and in philosophical methodology that occurred in the 1920s. This merged for a while with the logistic turn that had arisen in the mid-nineteenth-century, producing the ideal-and regimenting-language philosophy characteristic of logical positivism and logical pragmatism. This gave rise to the pursuit of theories of meaning for a natural language. The other, and perhaps more fruitful, branch of the linguistic turn was natural language philosophy, which eschewed the construction of formal languages and pursued connective analysis for purposes of philosophical elucidation and insight.
The meta-philosophical commitment was above all that philosophy is neither a science nor an extension of science. It is sui generis. Philosophy is a conceptual investigation that results in the description and clarification of conceptual structures and in the elimination of conceptual confusions.
It is not a contribution to human knowledge, as the natural and social sciences are, but a contribution to a distinctive form of human understanding. Some (such as the logical positivists and Wittgenstein) held that there are no philosophical propositions in the sense in which there are propositions of natural science; others (such as Ryle and Strawson) were less fastidious, but held the propositions they advanced to be a priori conceptual truths. This difference is not deep.
The primary methodological commitment was to meticulous examination of linguistic usage (ordinary or technical as the case may be 26 ) as a sine qua non for successful philosophical investigation. What was then to be done with the conceptual data thus obtained differed importantly both between the two branches of the linguistic turn (e.g. contrast Carnapian explication with Strawsonian connective analysis 27 ) and within each branch (contrast Austin with Grice). And, to be sure, this also depended greatly on the skills of the philosophers in marshalling the linguistic/conceptual data. 26 One could hardly investigate the concept of transfinite cardinal by examining ordinary usage. There was also a diagnostic consensus that surface features of the sentences of natural language are one major source of philosophical confusion. This, of course, was no novelty. What was novel was the manner in which these confusing features were winkled out, arrayed and used to shed light upon the conceptual problems of philosophy and to explain what leads us to build houses of cards.
The linguistic turn, linguistic philosophy, and so-called ordinary language philosophers were and still are subject to much criticism from many who have not properly followed the linguistic turn.
Viewed cursorily and unsympathetically from afar, one cannot see the twists and turns of the linguistic turn, let alone the panoramas to which it gave access and the views across philosophical landscapes that it made possible. I shall conclude by briefly warning against two common, but misconceived, criticisms.
One is the supposition that in order to describe linguistic usage one needs to consult one's linguistic intuitions. And, it is then queried, why should one's own intuitions -especially those of Oxford dons -be preferable to anyone else's? The second, and consequent idea is that if one wants to determine usage, one should do proper empirical surveys in which one would ask people to fill out questionnaires like any other decent social scientist. Then 'ordinary language philosophy' would be revealed as what it is, namely no more than a debased form of sociology of language.
The idea that in order to say what the correct use of a word or phrase is one has to consult one's intuitions is akin to supposing that in order to play chess a chess-master has to consult his intuitions on the rules of chess, or that a skilled mathematician has to consult his intuitions on what 12
x 12 is. An intuition is just a hunch or guess -and it is no more a hunch of a competent speaker that one says 'he was in the field' not 'he were in the field', than it is a hunch of a chess-master that the chess-king moves one square at a time or of a mathematician that 12 x 12 is 144.
It is precisely because of this that the idea that to specify the correct use of a familiar word one needs to do social surveys is misguided. A competent speaker of a natural language by definition knows how to use the common (and, if he is a specialist, the technical) words he uses, just as a competent chess-player or mathematician knows the rules constitutive of their expertise. That does not mean that he may not slip occasionally, overlook some familiar feature or other, or hesitate over borderline cases. What it does mean is that in marshalling grammatical rules in order to pinpoint the 26 differences between, say, accident and mistake, or perception and sensation, or mental images and photographic images, one does not need to consult anyone -only to reflect, and occasionally to use a good dictionary to jolt one's memory. (If one encounters disagreement over usage, that itself is an important datum -and one may proceed from there.) Philosophical skill does not consist merely in remembering features of usage with which any competent speaker or technical practitioner is familiar, but in selecting and marshalling those features of usage that will illuminate the problem at hand and show what linguistic analogies led one up the garden path. This may be no more than the first steps in one's philosophical endeavours. But unless one learns how to take them, and then takes them, one will continue barking up the wrong tree.* ________________________ * I am grateful to the editor, to Professor Hans Oberdiek and Professor Herman Philipse for their helpful comments.
